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NO. 21 MAY 2018 Introduction 
Fair Play: The Recent Common 
Agricultural Policy and Its 
Limited Effect on Development 
Bettina Rudloff and Michael Brüntrup 
Once again, we have the same old story: The negotiations on a new financial frame-
work for the European Union (EU) will also influence the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). Critics of the CAP are increasingly using its development policy (side) 
effects in the debate: European subsidies would promote poverty and food insecu-
rity in developing countries through cheap European exports and destroy prospects 
for those populations, especially for young people in rural areas. But is this accusa-
tion justified, and what implication does it have for the future CAP? 
 
The Commission’s communication on No-
vember 2017 (“Food and Agriculture of the 
Future”) presented the first indication of what 
a future CAP would contain: In addition to 
the traditional justifications for agricultural 
subsidies, such as safeguarding producers’ 
incomes and ensuring reasonable consumer 
prices, it also promises to take greater ac-
count of environmental concerns and the 
international dimensions of the CAP. Fur-
thermore, it stresses the need for coherence 
with other policies. But where does the CAP 
stand in terms of its effects on development? 
General Market-related Side Effects 
of the CAP for Developing Countries 
The CAP can affect developing countries 
through various mechanisms (“hinges”). 
“Export hinge” – If the EU, as the 
world’s largest exporter of agricultural 
products, increases its exports, prices on 
the world market and possibly also in devel-
oping countries might fall, which could 
undermine their competitiveness and dis-
place local products. 
“Import hinge” – As the world’s largest 
importer of agricultural products, the EU 
is also increasingly part of international 
value chains. An increase in input-intensive 
production could lead to more imports 
of required raw materials, such as animal 
feed, originating from developing countries. 
Direct and indirect “climate hinge” – 
The direct-effect results of the EU’s agri-
cultural greenhouse gas emissions are that 
they might lead to a decline in harvests, 
especially in tropical and subtropical 
regions. An indirect effect that could arise, 
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particularly with regard to the intensive 
rearing of cattle in the EU, is that it leads 
to more animal husbandry than would 
be optimal in terms of the climate. This 
would have the same effect as a production-
increasing subsidy, which could displace 
animal husbandry in developing countries. 
What Are the Side Effects of the 
Current CAP? 
It is important to differentiate between the 
actors that are affected. Increased produc-
tion levels and lower prices resulting from 
subsidies are detrimental to producers and 
exporting countries, but beneficial to con-
sumers and importers. The reverse applies 
to price increases. In the long term, how-
ever, production boosted by higher prices 
can reduce prices again, and thus support 
consumers who are initially burdened. This 
fundamental conflict of interest between 
producers and consumers is a dilemma of 
any agricultural policy intervention. Often, 
small farmers in developing countries buy 
more food than they sell, or they buy inputs 
such as animal feed. Thus, the net effect of 
price changes is decisive, but losers may still 
arise. Price stability is clearly positive for 
both sides – production and consumption. 
Export Hinge of Little Relevance 
Export subsidies. The WTO Ministerial Con-
ference of 2015 in Nairobi abolished the 
export subsidies of all signatory states; thus, 
the usual criticism of this unfair policy no 
longer applies. Even before their abolish-
ment, the subsidies had hardly been used 
since 2007, when world market prices had 
peaked. Other politically induced increases 
in exports of milk, for example, followed 
the abolition – instead of the introduction 
– of an agricultural policy intervention, 
that is, the end of the milk quota in 2015. 
The pushed exports may harm local produc-
tion in some developing countries. 
Production growth through internal sub-
sidies has largely ceased due to numerous 
CAP reforms (see Figure 1): 
∎ The basic payment per hectare – in-
cluding the payment to young farmers – 
supports the income and financial liqu-
idity of the farms, but the effect on pro-
duction is low. In regions with special 
requirements (such as mountainous 
areas), subsidies help to keep farming 
activities in the region. However, this 
is hardly effective in the ongoing high-
price phase. A large portion of these pay-
ments are passed on to the landowners 
via leases and, thus, do not influence 
production. 
∎ The “green” direct payment is linked to 
environmental criteria and could even 
reduce output by increasing the price of 
production. Due to a lack of strict crite-
ria, this current payment method is 
hardly effective. The same applies to the 
general criteria for all payments (“cross 
compliance”). 
∎ Up to 15 percent of national expenditure 
may still be coupled following the old 
CAP tradition – and thus be paid out in 
a way that distorts production and trade. 
This option is used by all Member States, 
often for animal products, in structurally 
weak regions except Germany. 
∎ A safety net in the form of guaranteed 
intervention prices still exists for some 
products (such as dairy products). Devel-
opment policy problems should only 
arise if the price incentive is so high that 
it offers production incentives. 
∎ Measures under the financially weaker 
second pillar are geared toward certain 
overarching objectives of rural develop-
ment, such as a focus on ecology. The 
effect on production has not been thor-
oughly analyzed. However, the chances 
for a potential increase in production 
through investment aids – or even its 
reduction through payments for special 
environmental services – are currently 
regarded as being low. 
Overall, the production and price effects 
of the current CAP are negligible. These 
effects are not determined by the overall 
size of the CAP budget but by its mostly 
production-neutral design: According to the 
Joint Research Centre, even the complete 
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Figure 1 
Production effects of the current CAP 
White: no effect; dark brown: production effect probable; light brown: production effect unclear but 
probably small; ↑ increase in production; ↓ decrease in production.  
Source: Own composition. 
abolition of the CAP would only lead to a 
slight decline in agricultural production. 
Import and Climate Hinges with 
Development Effects 
Import demands in international value 
chains. The consequences of European 
imports on development are often wrongly 
attributed (solely) to the CAP. The case of 
biofuels shows how development risks can 
arise along a global value chain. The EU 
demand in the form of the biofuels quota 
increases imports but originates in climate 
policy goals rather than being due to agri-
cultural concerns. The resulting competi-
tion in the cultivation of biofuels can lead 
to supply risks in developing countries. 
Soya imports for animal feed: The EU ranks 
second in the world after China in this area. 
Large-scale soy cultivation destroys ecosys-
tems in Latin America. There are certifica-
tion systems for land cultivation that have 
been cleared legally, but these are relatively 
easy to circumvent by means of selective 
declarations. The CAP promotes meat pro-
duction through voluntary coupled direct 
payments in some regions and a lack of 
internalization of external damages, for 
example to climate, health, and ground-
water. Agricultural policy initiatives such as 
the German protein strategy promote the 
idea of import substitution through the 
use of alternative domestic protein plants. 
However, their nutritional-physiological 
utilization by animals is limited, and a 
massive expansion in the use of these 
plants would also have ecological costs. 
Biofuel imports into the EU include sugar 
cane, soya, and palm oil, and their culti-
vation poses risks similar to those for soya. 
Here, too, well-functioning certification 
approaches are lacking. As of 2021, palm 
oil will be excluded from the guaranteed 
quota for biofuels. However, the majority 
of palm oil imports continue to be used in 
the food and cosmetics industries, for 
which there are no requirements, unlike in 
the fuel industry. A limitation of their use 
would require alternatives for processing 
(rape, sunflowers). Their cultivation re-
quires more land than oil palms do – with 
associated ecological risks. 
In all approaches to reducing EU agri-
cultural imports, the negative effects on 
exporting developing countries must be 
taken into account, too: For example, 
Malaysia, as an exporter for palm oil, is 
criticizing the exclusion of palm oil from 
the biofuel quota. In any case, any restric-
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tions on imports can result in the diversion 
of exports to other large palm oil or soy-
bean destinations, which undermines Euro-
pean development efforts. More of a focus 
on ecology in the CAP via stricter measures 
for “greening” the direct payments as well 
as cross-compliance and organic farming 
can have the opposite effect: Less produc-
tion intensity in the EU can increase the 
demand for imports, which may provide 
income opportunities, but it bears risks for 
developing countries, because their own 
food security supply could suffer as export 
levels increase. Many certification systems 
also act as positive incentives, but these 
cannot be used by poor, small famers due 
to complex production requirements and 
high participation costs. 
Climate impacts of animal husbandry. 
Worldwide, agriculture accounts for 11 per-
cent of human greenhouse gas emissions – 
in the EU and Germany, methane emissions 
from cattle farming are a major source. 
Production-side solutions would be the end 
of coupled payments in livestock produc-
tion. Taxing soy imports could also make 
production more expensive, and thus re-
duce demand – especially if European 
alternatives were not promoted concurrent-
ly. On the consumption side, demand taxes 
(e.g., a “meat tax”) could be used outside 
the CAP to curb consumption – as is done 
with other consumer goods – which would 
have the advantage that imports would also 
be affected. However, the effects should be 
mitigated through socio-political means so 
that poor consumers are not disadvantaged. 
On a global scale, however, the extent of 
the impact from reduced levels of animal 
husbandry is small, but it could serve as 
an important role model. 
Future CAP: Less Coupling, 
More Coherence 
The damaging effects of today’s CAP on 
development only remain in a few areas, 
such as voluntary coupled payments, the 
reduction of the milk quota, and through 
complex interactions with other policy 
areas. Current agricultural trade between 
the EU and developing countries is there-
fore determined less by the CAP than by 
policy-independent productivity levels and 
specializations. But even when defining 
a necessary reform for environmental 
reasons, old patterns must be avoided, such 
as using more production-coupled instru-
ments, thus triggering new development 
risks. 
The historical injustices created by past 
subsidies, which at least could have sup-
ported today’s EU productivity, and the 
few remaining effects of the recent CAP 
on development should be countered. 
The appropriate approaches should come 
less from the CAP than from development 
(infrastructure aid) and trade policy (pro-
tective tariffs). In order to link these differ-
ent policy areas coherently with the CAP, 
the EU should use existing policy-impact 
assessment instruments. In the future, the 
EU should orientate these explicitly to 
the internationally agreed upon indicators 
for the UN Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). Above all, developing countries 
must be more closely involved in this pro-
cess. Only then can the potentially affected 
actors themselves be able to properly ex-
press whether, and how, the CAP is detri-
mental to their development – and the 
possible damages are not just stated or 
assumed by European actors. 
Dr. Bettina Rudloff is a Senior Associate in the EU/Europe Division at SWP. 
Dr. Michael Brüntrup is a Senior Researcher at the German Development Institute (DIE). 
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